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Private sector between protection and competition
To attain a
flourishing market economy, it is not sufficient to abolish centralized
planning nor government monopoly. The state must intervene to correct
deficiencies and regulate the optimal allocation of resources, the tradeoff,
and the social equity.
The logic of
"the market is all" has failed (the Washington Consensus failure is a
good proof) as well as the logic of "the state is all". Therefor, as
shown in South-East Asia, the best solution resides in the integration of both
of them. When applying this new logic, Syria must consider the following:
1.
The private sector is an
economic actor, which must take the major responsibility of development. The
public sector must focus on important services, productive projects and
indispensable public goods as well.
2.
The private sector can
invest in projects similar to those currently owned by the pubic sector.
3.
Private and public
sectors can work together in services and productive mixed projects.
4.
The state and the public
sector have to support the private sector through big projects contracted with
foreign sides by obliging them to subcontract with the private sector.
Under
protectionism, the private sector was featured by:
·
Private share represented
two thirds of total investments in 1992-1993, then, it decreased to 40% in
1997-1998.
·
Private commercial
deficit attained 62.5-75% during 1992-1998.
·
Private sector share in
the Added value of manufacture increased from 52.5% in 1995 to 73% in 1997.
Under
protectionism system, private sectors enjoyed fewer risks and almost realized
profits as big as rental incomes. Despite these advantages, this system is
criticized because of the preponderance of the consumption industry (limited to
the last stage in the technological chain), lax, negligence of research,
development and maintenance, lack of training, decrease of quality, lowering
private industrial exports and finally deter the private sector from real
entrepreneurship.
Government did
not proceed to get rid of these obstacles, it preferred managing the crisis. It
contributed in the complexity because of:
·
The absence of clear
strategy
·
The increase in
production costs due to hike in the prices raw materials manufactured by the
public sector, to the increasing customs tariffs, to the lack of industrial
credits (2.5% of total banking credits), to the absence of export financing and
to the underdeveloped banking system.
When private
sector moves to the competition, it will face several challenges:
1.
Its underdeveloped
industries (depending on imported components) and others which lack support and
comprehensive rehabilitation
2.
Degradation in Syrian
balance of trade.
3.
Endeavors to obtain the
minimum of investments
4.
Inequity between Syrian
economic actors and Arab and European peers
The
development of Syrian investment environment necessitates:
1.
Establishing integrated
industrial zones supplied with infrastructure services necessary for investment
2.
Human resources with an
adequate reform of educational system
3.
Developing the banking
system (restructuring the commercial bank and establishing a mixed business
bank etc.)
4.
Active government
administration (obvious strategy, legislation, active jurisdiction).
5.
Establishing a committee
to promote investment (comprehensive economic database, preliminary and final
feasibility studies, avoiding cumbersome bureaucracy)
The genuine
partnership between the state and the private sector is a vital issue. It
supposes the integration between the quality of state performance on the macroeconomic
level and the good performance of private sector on the microeconomic level.
In his
comments, Mr. R. SEIF mentions that the private sector role became marginal
after the nationalization in 1961 and 1965. The myriad of laws and decisions
has practically transformed this sector into a handcraft one. Due to these
circumstances, this striving sector to survive has developed new ways to cheat
and to conceal its activities. Despite its increasing size, this deformed
sector still suffers because of new challenges imposed by mutations in local,
regional and international economic structures. These tumultuous circumstances
have been partly compensated by local market monopoly under protectionism,
which allowed him to restore all parasite costs, considerable wasting and
little return.
But, things
have been changed because:
1.
Local purchase power
shrank,
2.
Products of Arab free
trade zone submerge the Syrian market while Syrian products are unable to
penetrate those markets,
3.
International
competition provoked an industrial crisis leading to huge stocks and shrinking
profits
Figures show
that the total inter-Arab investment received by Syria is 436 million dollars
in the period 1982-1998, meanwhile Syrian investments in Arab countries
approximate 1.3 billion dollars.
Mr. SEIF
pretends that protectionism is harmful to the economy. Real protection resides
in equal competition among local products in order to improve production
processes, to keep industrials faraway from extortion and release them from
fear. The budgets of education and research and development must increase.
Companies must be supported to introduce developed technology. Industrial zones
are indispensable as well as credit facilities, and active fiscal system.
He disagrees
with the effectiveness of mixed sector because it contains the disadvantages of
both sectors, writes Mr. SEIF. It is time to objectively analyze every public
economic company in order to support it, to transform it into a shareholding
company, or to close it with a fair compensation to the employees. The
alternative solution is in creating an environment apt to drain savings and
funds to shareholding companies capable to work within complete transparency
and managed by real competence, as before nationalization where markets were opened
to all goods. Syrian goods exports represented 26% of national income in 1956.
But now, despite protectionism, they do not exceed 6%.